In addition to the rapid growth in funding, the government departed from traditional supply-side approaches which directed expenditures to state agencies and institutions. Three-rural expenditures have increasingly been targeted directly to farmers. For example, subsidies for grain production went previously to state-owned grain trading enterprises to offset their trading losses from subsidizing procurement; under the new strategy, subsidies are paid directly to farmers for adopting improved seeds. The government also seeks to improve the targeting of subsidies. This includes a shift toward welfare improvements, rather than only output-based indicators. 1 The three rurals are agriculture (nongye), rural villages (nongcun) and farmers (nongmin).
Are these subsidy programs reaching the poor? The history of subsidy programs around the world is strewn with failures. The 2004 World Development Report: Making Services Work for Poor People 2 drew lessons from empirical studies to urge policy-makers to pay particular attention to designing institutions to ensure that benefits reach the intended recipients, emphasizing that it is not enough simply to put more money into programs.
In this paper, we examine the current direct-subsidy policy for farmers as a case study for gauging the effectiveness of the Chinese government's recent efforts. In particular, we assess the benefit-incidence of the current subsidies by asking what types of farm households have more access to the subsidies. Even though it has rightly been pointed out that, in the aggregate, the direct-subsidy programs for farmers have had a positive impact on reducing the incidence of absolute poverty in recent years, 3 we are concerned that China's decentralized policy-making approach and the absence of a rigorous vetting of new programs may mean that, as the subsidies have grown, an increasing proportion of them may go to the wealthier households, subverting one of the government's key goals: reducing income disparities in rural areas. Moreover, as the costs of direct-subsidy programs rise, they impose a growing burden on local governments for co-financing, and the differences in local fiscal capacities can thwart the redistributive intent of threerural programs and amplify existing income disparities across regions.
Using data from a 2005 Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) survey of farm households, we also look at household differences in obtaining subsidies. The results of this assessment show the rural subsidy programs to have had a strikingly regressive impact. We find that higher-income households, households with a Party member and households in richer regions all receive more subsidies. In contrast, farm households headed by persons with a low level of education or ethnic-minority households are disadvantaged in receiving subsidies, as are those living in poorer regions. These results indicate that, at least in the early years of the new policy, the distribution of direct subsidies has not been able effectively to benefit the poor and protect disadvantaged groups. More importantly, they indicate that, despite a decade-long effort by the Ministry of Finance to strengthen equalization transfers, the distribution of fiscal resources remains so skewed that the financing capacity of local governments continues to distort national policy implementation.
Previous Studies
The design of subsidy programs markedly affects benefit-incidence, but it is not always easy to determine the "right" mix in the design. In the United States, for example, we find a continuing controversy about who ultimately benefits from government agricultural subsidy schemes. Research by Rosine and Helmberger revealed that, between 1948 and 1970, 92 per cent of US agricultural subsidies went to landowners. 5 Kirwan found that this situation had changed by 1992, when about 75 per cent of agricultural subsidies went to agricultural producers and only 25 per cent to landowners. 6 However, other scholars have reached different conclusions. 7 Adopting a broader perspective, with a careful review of the econometric evidence and consideration of the implications of a simple static model, Alston noted that, for aggregate US agricultural policies, agricultural producers received 50 per cent of agricultural subsidies, whereas landowners received 25 per cent and consumers 20 per cent; efficiency losses accounted for 5 per cent. 8 However, Qiu et al. found that the effects differed for different types of rental contracts, with landlords capturing 37 to 38 per cent of the benefits under cash leases and 86 to 88 per cent under share contracts.
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For developing countries where a significant proportion of the population lives in poverty, it is more important to consider whether it is the poor who are benefiting from government subsidies and welfare programs. International experience shows that the poor are often last in line to receive benefits from government fiscal expenditures. 10 It is estimated that, in 1973-74, the poor in India benefited from less than one-sixth of total central government expenditures, 11 and the richest quintile received three times more health-care subsidies than the poorest quintile. 12 In Nepal, in 1996, about one-half of educational spending accrued to the richest quintile, and only 11 per cent to the poorest quintile. 13 Even when poor groups are targeted for support, it can be a major challenge to keep programs from being "captured" by the non-poor, who will exercise their economic power by contributing funds to political actors in exchange for preferential treatment with regard to welfare services.
14 Although empirical evidence remains inconclusive, studies suggest that the relative vulnerability to "capture" of various levels of government may be context-specific. For China, using matching methods and a 2001-04 panel household and village dataset from designated poor villages, Park and Wang found that, although China's flagship poverty alleviation program increased both government-and village-financed investments significantly, the program did not increase either the income or the consumption of the poorest households. The program did, however, increase the income and consumption of the richest households by 6.1 to 9.2 per cent. 15 These problems are due in part to both institutional design and governance. Because of weak equalization mechanisms in China's fiscal system, regional disparities in local government fiscal capacities are large, and populations in poor regions are disadvantaged with regard to farm subsidy programs that require cofinancing from local governments. To the extent that poor people are more prevalent in poor regions, they may lose out in benefits if local governments are unable to fund the subsidy programs fully. 16 Some benefits may be stolen from pro-poor programs when localities obtain their "poverty hat" designations through corruption 17 and when local leaders implement central government policy selectively, such as picking relatively well-off villages to receive subsidies in order to showcase them to the higher levels as "successes". Under the new three-rural strategy, initiatives come from various ministries and agencies to provide direct subsidies to the rural populace, and the programs reflect a diverse range of objectives. Some subsidies are aimed at promoting production or improving productivity, some at improving farmers' social welfare, and others at improving farmers' living conditions. Over the past decade, these programs, beginning on a trial basis, expanded rapidly both in scale and scope. For example, in 2002 the Ministry of Agriculture introduced a subsidy for farmers who planted high-quality soybean varieties in the northeast. Over time, upon verification of the use of the improved varieties, the program was expanded to include wheat, paddy rice and corn; the subsidy is paid at a fixed rate per unit of land. Similarly, the "two exemptions and one subsidy" (TEOS) program, introduced in 2001 by the Ministry of Education, aims at reducing the out-of-pocket costs of compulsory education for rural children.
The major direct-subsidy programs are presented and described briefly in Table 1 . Following the government's three-rural terminology, we divide the programs into production subsidies (agriculture), social welfare and public services (farmers' livelihood) and living conditions (villages). The direct-subsidy programs are huge and have large pools of beneficiaries. For example, there are some 835 million participants in the New Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS) and some 130 million children benefit from the TEOS.
20 Surprisingly, despite their mammoth size and the government's eagerness to trumpet its efforts to support the three rurals, there is no comprehensive reporting of the overall scale of these programs at the national level. In Table 2 we present a complete set of data on the main types of direct subsidies to farmers financed by the central government. The data are constructed from scattered information released by the various ministries, commissions and agencies, and found on ministerial websites and press reports. This information is checked against reports by the government to the National People's Congress, and in several instances we extrapolate to create a complete time-series for the 2003-09 period. Altogether, central government expenditures for direct subsidies to farm households grew from 12.2 billion yuan in 2003 to 234.7 billion yuan in 2009. It should be noted that the overall scale of the program is in fact larger than presented here, since these figures represent only central government inputs. Five of these programs also have input from provincial and local governments. For the New Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS), for example, in 2009 the central government contributed 40 yuan per participant and required provincial and local governments to contribute at least an equal amount jointly, so that the total government subsidy was more than 80 yuan per participant. We estimate the total scale of government inputs to direct-subsidy programs to have reached 300 billion yuan, or 4 per cent of total budgetary expenditures, in 2009. The direct subsidies to farmers have had a clearly positive impact on farmers' incomes and have moderated urban-rural income gaps and disparities in publicservice provision (see Table 3 This estimate is based on extrapolating from the 31 per cent share of total subsidies accounted for by the programs under cost-sharing arrangements. If the cost share borne by local governments was 50 per cent of the five programs, then local governments would have contributed another 72 billion yuan. 22 In accordance with Chinese statistical standards, average per capita net income of farmers refers to net income derived from production activities, which equals gross income despite the contribution of direct subsidies, the income gap between urban and rural areas continued to widen. This highlights both the magnitude of the effort required and the need to target the programs to poor farmers and poor regions better so that they contribute more significantly to raising the low end of the income distribution. Total central government subsidies to farmers in Table 2 , divided by the rural-registered population in the same years.
2/
In accordance with Chinese statistical standards, direct subsidies for grain production, wellbred seeds and production inputs in Table 2 are included as part of the so-called "average per capita net income of farmers". Therefore, the average per capita net income of farmers, without taking into account any subsidies, should equal the unadjusted (that is, the statistical) average per capita net income of farmers minus the average per capita subsidy.
3/ Equals the adjusted average per capita net income (without taking any subsidies into account), plus the average per capita subsidy. Source: Calculated from the China Statistical Yearbook (annual).
Program Design and Implementation
The subsidies can be grouped into three broad categories, based on their design.
Pro-poor subsidies
Only 3 of the 14 subsidy programs listed in Table 2 are means-tested, with eligibility limited to households with incomes below specified thresholds. One of the earliest such programs was the free textbook program, created in response to survey findings that the cost of textbooks was a significant barrier to school attendance for children (including part of the government subsidies, as in note 2 of Table 3 , minus productionoriented expenditures). Therefore, subsidies to farm households in the form of reduced, exempted or partially reimbursed consumption expenditures (primarily expenditures for public services and daily-life facilities) statistically are not included in the average per capita net income of farmers; however, such subsidies did indeed increase the actual income levels of farm households. from the poorest households. The initial central government textbook subsidy totaled 200 million yuan in 2003. Eligibility was limited to students from families with incomes below the poverty line (nationally defined as 825 yuan per capita) and confined to the counties targeted for poverty alleviation. 23 At the time, it was planned that the program would gradually expand to cover all central and western provinces, and that by the end of 2007 it would include all poor rural children nationwide.
24 By 2005, however, funding had increased to 2.7 billion yuan, and the program had expanded to become the "two exemptions and one subsidy" (TEOS). It was covering an estimated 30 million students and, in addition to textbooks, was also providing an exemption for "miscellaneous fees" and a boarding subsidy to reduce the overall financial costs of schooling for poor families. In the same year, the government decided to extend the TEOS to all students participating in rural compulsory education, beginning with the western provinces in 2006 and spreading to all provinces starting in 2007. 25 Today only the boarding subsidy remains means-tested and targeted to students from poor families; this component accounts for 11 per cent of all TEOS expenditures.
The two other explicitly pro-poor direct-subsidy programs are the rural minimum living allowance (dibao 低保), an income-support scheme under which households receive subsidies to bring their incomes up to a stipulated minimum, and the major medical relief fund, which provides financial assistance to cover catastrophic healthcare costs for poor families.
Reimbursement Subsidies
These subsidies provide partial reimbursement for eligible expenditures. They include subsidies for well-bred seeds, animal breeds, agricultural insurance, the purchase of agricultural machinery and household electrical appliances, and the construction of household biogas digesters. Because qualification requires prior expenditure, the subsidies may favor higher income groups if the expenditures are large relative to income and if the expenditures or products are highly income-elastic. For example, the program to subsidize household electrical and electronic appliances (jiadian xiaxiang 家电下乡) provides a 13 per cent rebate for up to two eligible items per household; these include cell phones, microwave ovens, air conditioners, color televisions and computers. Given maximum allowable prices for the listed items, a household can receive a rebate of up to 910 yuan. The high cost of these purchases means that it is likely that the 7.54 billion yuan in central funding allocated in 2009, during the program's first year, was captured disproportionally by higher-income 23 These are the 592 "Key Development Counties" that are the main recipients of assistance under the national poverty-reduction program. 24 households and richer regions. Over the four-year duration of the program, however, the benefits may have trickled down to more farm households.
Universal Subsidies
By far the largest category is that of the universal subsidies, received by all. These are neither means-tested nor do they require counterpart expenditures. In this category we include both subsidies for grain production and comprehensive subsidies for agricultural inputs, which are granted on the basis of arable land holdings and are fairly evenly distributed among the rural populace. Likewise, subsidies for the NCMS are given to all participants in the scheme, which now includes all farmers. As noted above, starting in 2007, subsidies for textbooks and exemption of fees under the TEOS program were provided to all students participating in rural compulsory education. Figure 3 shows the growth and proportions of the three types of subsidies and their changes over time.
Overall, universal subsidies have always dominated the direct-subsidy programs, and in 2009 they accounted for two-thirds of the total. The pro-poor subsidies grew rapidly at the beginning of the decade, but their share declined when the TEOS became universally available. However, in fact the universal subsidies are broadly pro-poor in the current context since, on average, rural incomes are less than onethird of urban incomes. Moreover, the financing of these programs has a second redistributive component, discussed below, that is embedded in the current regime of central government transfer payments.
The worrying trend in the overall subsidy program design is the rapid growth of reimbursement subsidies over the past 3 to 4 years. In 2005 they represented only 7.7 per cent of the programs, but by 2009 their proportion had grown to 28.8 per cent. Given their potentially pro-rich bias, this is a trend that bears watching. Table 2 .
Implementation
There are two features of China's fiscal system that shape policy implementation. First is the high degree of decentralization, under which local governments are assigned a very wide range of responsibilities. The central government provides for less than one-quarter of all budgetary expenditures, and this share has fallen sharply over the past decade (Figure 4) . With respect to the programs of direct subsidies for farmers, even though the initiatives come from the central level, they are implemented by county governments, which are three levels down in the five-level administrative hierarchy. 26 This matters, because fiscal resources flow downward, level by level, and local governments in the lower tiers are disadvantaged in gaining access to these resources. More importantly, the system is financially decentralized, in the sense that local governments must finance their assigned functions, and intergovernmental transfers are only loosely based on financial needs. As a result, policy implementation is often constrained by local financial capacities. This problem was especially acute during the 1990s and the early 2000s.
28 Implementation of direct-subsidy programs that require cofinancing by provincial and local governments may vary across localities depending on 26 The five levels are central government, province, municipality, county and township. 27 Over the past decade, the government has significantly increased efforts to redistribute fiscal resources toward poor regions. 30 One of the main tools used by the Ministry of Finance for redistributive purposes is a division of the provinces into eastern, central and western regions. Under this tripartite division, central government transfers 31 are tilted toward the western provinces, which, on average but not uniformly, are the poorest. The central provinces are also recipients of substantial transfers, 29 Table 4 above we present the central-local cost-sharing ratios for five major programs, including the TEOS and NCMS (New Cooperative Medical Scheme), and show how they differ across the three regions. The table reveals that, although the TEOS and NCMS are universal programs aimed at all farm households, the differential rates of central government financing give these programs a redistributive, or pro-poor, element.
However, these regions are enormous; the populations of the eastern, central and western regions are 448.6 million, 500.7 million and 367.3 million respectively. It is therefore hardly surprising that huge economic and fiscal disparities exist, not only across regions, but also across provinces within the same region, and even across counties within the same province. Table 5 provides illustrative statistics on the differences across regions. Although all indicators for the eastern provinces are higher than those for the central and western regions, there are notable anomalies within each region. For example, Shandong, the poorest province in the eastern region, had the fifth-lowest per capita fiscal expenditure of all 31 provinces in 2009. In contrast, Qinghai, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia and Xinjiang, all western provinces, were ranked fifth through eighth in per capita expenditures, just after the three municipalities of Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin. 33 To illustrate how these differences in fiscal capacity affect policy implementation, and how the tripartite division of the country falls short of the redistributive ideal, we look at the differences in rural minimum living stipends across provinces-a program mainly funded by local governments-and, in particular, at the plight of Shandong. In 2009, the average stipend in the eastern region was 190 yuan per person/month. Shanghai had the highest stipend, at 246 yuan per person/month, whereas in Shandong it was only 100 yuan per person/month, or 53 per cent of the regional average and 41 per cent of the average in Shanghai. These gaps are greater than the gaps in the farmers' average per capita net income. 34 In 2009, the stipend in Shandong was lower than that of Inner Mongolia, Chongqing, Hainan and Jilin, four provinces in the central and western regions.
Likewise, in 2009 the available funding per capita 35 for the NCMS in Shandong was 103 yuan, which was 48 per cent of the average in the eastern region and 18 per cent of the average in Shanghai. In fact, the availability of funding in Shandong was similar to the average for the central region, and slightly lower than that for the western region (at 105 yuan). Since Shandong belongs to the group of eastern provinces, it does not enjoy fiscal support for the NCMS from central finance, which is only distributed to the central and western provinces.
Differences in the Quality of Governance
The preconditions for subsidies being able to reach the target groups effectively include accurate identification of the groups, good governance and rigorous monitoring of fund use. As the Chinese central government has strengthened its support to rural public services in recent years, it has increasingly faced difficulties of fund delivery. Accountability relationships are weak at multiple levels and among service providers, most of which are public institutions and local governments, with the result that local levels do not always comply with central policies, and central transfers are not always used as intended. Citizen involvement in public-service planning, provision and monitoring is also limited. 36 There are no guarantees that the subsidies are distributed in line with the policy objectives. When effective monitoring of subsidy delivery is lacking, farm households with more social resources undoubtedly "capture" more subsidies. Although the monitoring system has become more comprehensive in recent years, some incidents justify our increased concerns in this regard. For instance, the official newspaper China Youth Daily notes that, when reporting on the area of arable land in Hubei Province's Jianli County, some village cadres either under-reported the amount of arable land held by some villagers or did not report it at all. Instead, they added the concealed amount of land to that held by their relatives. Villagers also tried to influence the village cadres so that they would receive direct subsidies from the state for grain production. Between 2004 and 2008, in the three villages most of the 3 million yuan in direct subsidies for grain production was embezzled. 37 Another report states that cadres in a village in Xi'an, Shaanxi Province, were not subject to any sort of examination or public disclosure before applying for a minimum living allowance in either their own names or those of their family members, thus depriving many eligible villagers of the benefits. The submitted list of 20 persons qualifying for the subsidies contained the names of six cadres and excluded the names of others who should have qualified.
38 Such cases are not uncommon.
How Subsidies Reach Farm Households: An Empirical Study
In an attempt to identify factors that affect access to direct subsidies, in this section we analyze the distribution of subsidies based on a set of household survey data.
Data
The data come from a survey covering 24,000 farm households in 346 counties of all 31 provinces, undertaken by the MOA in 2005. The data contain household profiles and detailed information on incomes and expenditures. Among other questions, the farmers were asked about "income received from the government", including income from subsidies, allowances received from township and village cadres, supplementary pay for locally sponsored teachers, and pensions and allowances for veterans and martyrs. 39 Unfortunately, the survey does not provide a breakdown by type of subsidy, so we cannot analyze the specific programs, nor can we distinguish between central and local subsidies. Nevertheless, it provides valuable information to supplement other sources on the effects of direct subsidies. Although the scale of subsidies in 2005 was quite small compared to that in the following years, most of the subsidy programs had already been introduced. More October 2011. 39 We adopt dummy variables to control for the effect of non-subsidies.
importantly, the subsidy designs have remained unchanged since 2005, and there have been no significant changes in local fiscal capacities. The 2005 empirical study thus remains valid for the current situation. Even though the data used in the empirical analysis do not strictly meet our analytical needs, they allow us to make some overall judgements about the distribution of direct subsidies among farm households.
For this paper, we were given access to only part of the dataset. It consists of 8,455 households, of which 6,666 provided the information required for our analysis from three provinces randomly selected in each region. 40 The provinces include Liaoning, Zhejiang and Guangdong from the eastern region; Shanxi, Anhui and Jiangxi from the central region; and Shaanxi, Sichuan and Yunnan from the western region.
We found that all households in our sample reported that they had received government subsidies in 2005 41 -an impressive feat indicating that government subsidies were indeed reaching all farm households. Among the sample households, the average subsidy amounted to 304.8 yuan per household and 85.8 yuan per capita. These amounts are higher than those reported in Table 4 , because they include both central and local subsidies. In addition, they also include some remuneration payments for rural officials, teachers and so forth. The number of households and the amounts of the subsidy per household and per person for our nine provinces are presented in Table 6 . With the exception of Yunnan, the amounts of subsidies per person in the five central and western regions were all smaller than those in the eastern region, and the average per capita subsidy in the central and western regions was smaller that in the eastern region.
Variables and the Model
What factors influence the distribution of government subsidies? We adopted two indicators as dependent variables: subsidy per household and subsidy per capita.
We grouped the factors affecting the amount of subsidies that the farm households received into four categories:
a. Resource endowment, namely, arable land area owned by the household. This is because direct subsidies for grain production and comprehensive subsidies for agricultural inputs are directly related to the amount of arable land; b. Income level. Households with higher incomes have an obvious edge in accessing these subsidies; c. Regional fiscal capacity. Provinces with stronger local fiscal capacities might give more subsidies to local farm households; 42 and d. Governance. Farm households with resource and information advantages might have more opportunities to "capture" subsidies, due to weak monitoring, poor transparency of information and insufficient public participation in delivery.
With respect to the impact of income level, we use: a) per capita mean net income of farmers, excluding subsidies, to study the relevance of the amount of subsidy received to the specific income level of the farm household; and b) whether the household belongs to the absolute poverty group, the low-income poverty group or the non-poor group. In line with the official government definitions, the 2005 threshold for absolute poverty is a per capita average net income of less than 683 yuan; for low income, a per capita average net income ranging between 683 yuan and 944 yuan; and for non-poor, a per capita average net income higher than 944 yuan.
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These indicators enable us to determine whether the poor population has more or less difficulty accessing government subsidies.
We use three indicators to measure resource and information advantages: a) whether the farm household includes any Party member(s); b) whether the farm household belongs to an ethnic minority; 44 44 Some minority groups are, on average, relatively socially advantaged, while others, on average, are extremely disadvantaged. Thus, measuring social disadvantage by using minority membership as a whole probably disguises the extent of disadvantage among the particularly education. We assume that non-ethnic-minority households with a Party member and a household head with a higher level of education should have a stronger capacity to "capture" subsidies. The control variables include age, gender, the duration of the household head's migrant employment, whether the members of the household include township and village cadres (xiangcun ganbu 乡村干部), and whether there are any veterans or martyrs (jun-lieshu 军烈属) among the members of the household. Regions with large non-Han Chinese populations are major beneficiaries and enjoy a disproportionately large share of the subsidies. The Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region is populated by Uyghurs who are particularly disadvantaged. However, all our sample provinces have small populations of ethnic minorities. 45 In line with the survey definitions, "income received from the government" includes not only fiscal subsidies for farmers but also allowances received by township and village cadres and veterans or martyrs. The latter two are not the focus of this article. Because the survey data do not differentiate information about the different types of income, we use two dummy Based on the above, the specific variables in the empirical models and the profiles of the variables are provided in Tables 7 (above) and 8 (below). 
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Estimation Results
We employ ordinary least squares estimation techniques to produce estimated results for four models. These are presented in Table 9 . 1. The amount of arable land owned by a farm household significantly affects the household's access to government subsidies. This is consistent with government policy to provide direct subsidies for grain production. Universal subsidy programs for grain-producing households have truly benefitted all farm households.
2. Consistent with the above analysis, the income level of a farm household has an important impact on its capacity to receive government subsidies. The higher variables, "whether the farm household includes township and village cadres" and "whether the farm household includes veterans or martyrs", to control for the effects of these two factors. The use of three other control variables in the regression is intended to control the possible effect of gender and age of the household head and his/her employment situation on the subsidy acquisition of a family. 46 Table 8 the net income of a farm household, the more subsidies it will receive per capita. An increase of 10 per cent in per capita net income will provide a 1.9 per cent increment in per capita subsidy (Model 3). From the estimated coefficient, it is shown that the poorer a poverty household is, the fewer subsidies it receives. This seems to support our earlier conjecture that more reimbursement subsidies might result in more benefits going to wealthier households. 14 Note: ***, ** and * represent respectively significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels; estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
3. Indeed, farm households in more advantageous positions and with more social resources have a stronger capacity to "capture" government subsidies. Specifically, with other conditions remaining constant, it is easier for farm households headed by persons with a higher level of education and for non-ethnic-minority farm households to receive subsidies; farm households that include a Party member are also more likely to "capture" subsidies. The incremental benefits to the advantaged groups may be due to their resource and information advantages.
4. Farm households in provinces with a stronger local fiscal capacity receive more subsidies than their counterparts in provinces with a weaker local fiscal capacity. The regression shows that a 10 per cent increase in provincial fiscal expenditure per capita will produce about a 0.9 to 1.4 percent increase in government subsidy per household or per capita. Although the policies are designed to favor the central and western regions, this does not offset the gaps in subsidies resulting from differences in local fiscal capacity.
Conclusions
Over the past decade, China has gradually introduced a new development paradigm, with new policies and approaches under which the government channels resources to the rural sector and targets raising incomes and improving services and living conditions. This paper focuses on one of the key innovative approaches, providing direct subsidies to farmers. As the programs are continuing to grow rapidly and to expand in scope, it may be too early to reach definitive conclusions, but some clear trends are worth noting.
First, the contribution of direct subsidies to the actual income of farm households has become increasingly significant. These subsidies, although not yet reversing the widening rural-urban income gap, are clearly making a contribution towards curbing it.
At the same time, there are significant problems in the distribution of subsidies. Our analysis shows that the rural subsidy program has a generally regressive impact: poorer households receive less money, and households in poorer provinces, regardless of income level, receive less money. This finding is consistent with that of an internal report by the Poverty Reduction Office of the Chinese State Council, which similarly found that the distribution of direct subsidies for farmers does not serve the most vulnerable groups. 47 Since the development economics literature is replete with examples of government subsidies and poverty alleviation programs not reaching the poorest of the poor and instead reaching the well-connected, many of our findings on the directsubsidy programs, although disappointing, are not surprising. What stands out in the Chinese case is the dominant role played by the intergovernmental fiscal system in thwarting the redistributive impact of the pro-poor subsidy programs. This is due to the highly decentralized nature of the Chinese fiscal system, where so many vital responsibilities are assigned to low levels of government-many with limited fiscal resources-and where the central government's capacity to direct intergovernmental transfers to areas where they are needed remains woefully inadequate. The result is that differences in fiscal capacity across provinces overwhelm the central government subsidies and farm households in the richer provinces receive more subsidies, thus further widening regional income and wealth gaps.
The regressive inter-personal distribution of subsidies is due partly to the design of some of the programs, by which the farmers must first incur expenses, the costs of which may constrain the ability of poor to access subsidies. The rapid growth of reimbursement subsidies over the past 2 or 3 years is therefore disturbing.
On the basis of this assessment, we conclude that, to reduce income disparities more effectively in the rural sector, China requires more centralized management of program design to ensure that subsidy programs are aimed at the poor and lowincome groups. Providing wide access to information and inviting public participation in implementation, along with strengthening government monitoring and control, may help to reduce "élite capture" of program benefits. In the end, though, efforts at promoting social equity and building a "harmonious society"-including programs such as these direct subsidies for farmers-will have at best only marginal impact, unless they are supported by systemic reforms to repair the intergovernmental fiscal system, which is the root cause of unequal public services and fiscal provisions both horizontally and vertically in the Chinese administrative system.
